|
|
 |
| |
|
|
|
Simultaneous and Alternating Models via Queuing System |
|
|
|
PP: 161-169 |
|
|
|
doi:10.18576/amis/190114
|
|
|
|
Author(s) |
|
|
|
Salsabeel M. Abd El-Salam,
Shimaa Atef,
Essam El-Seidy,
A. Elmasry,
Amira R. Abdel-Malek,
|
|
|
|
Abstract |
|
|
| It is a privilege for us to examine this unique strategic queuing problem in queuing systems in this research. This area focuses on multiple decision-making queuing entities, such as servers and consumers. This is not the case with the conventional queuing theory, which sees them as passive, non-judgmental entities that are endogenously determined. The multiple agents in a queuing system have conflicting interests, which must be addressed through the use of game theory principles and analytical techniques. Thus, strategic queuing may be defined as the study of queuing systems from a game-theoretical standpoint. We examine a single-queue system in which human servers can decide how diligently to process orders that arrive concurrently or in different orders. We discuss the implications for managers and owners of businesses who are trying to improve service delivery systems. In this paper, we examine M/M/2/∞ through various game theory modes, including strictly alternating, random alternating, and simultaneous games. We also derive the expected waiting time for some of these models.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
