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Fault Detection of the Camellia Cipher against Single Byte Differential Fault Analysis |
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PP: 951-957 |
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Author(s) |
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Wei Li,
Xiaoling Xia,
Yi Wang,
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Abstract |
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| The Camellia is a 128-bit block cipher published by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000. Since the research of differential fault analysis against Camellia was proposed, much work has been devoted to realizing a more efficient different fault analysis. It is a very strong analysis for ciphers when a single fault is injected into the last several rounds of encryption and the whole secret key could be recovered. Thus, how to detect the faults injected into the Camellia cipher with low overhead of complexity is an open problem. This paper gives an answer to this problem by presenting a fault detection of the Camellia block cipher in the single-byte fault model. Our result in this study could detect the faults with negligible cost when faults are even injected into the last three rounds. |
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